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Abstract
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at
dierent ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? This paper proposes
a novel specication for residual earnings that allows for a lifetime prole in the
persistence and variance of labor income shocks. We show that the statistical model
is identied and estimate it using PSID data. We strongly reject the hypothesis of
a at life-cycle prole for persistence and variance of persistent shocks, but not for
the variance of transitory shocks. Shocks to earnings are only moderately persistent
(around 0:75) for young individuals. Persistence rises with age up to unity until
midway in life. On the other hand, the variance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-
shaped prole over the life cycle (with a minimum of 0:01 and a maximum of 0:045).
Our estimate of persistence, for most of the working life, is substantially lower than
typical estimates in the literature. We investigate the implications of these proles for
consumption-savings behavior with a standard life-cycle model. The welfare cost of
idiosyncratic risk implied by the age-dependent income process is 32% lower compared
to an AR(1) process without age proles. This is mostly due to a higher degree of
consumption insurance for young workers, for whom persistence is moderate. We
conclude that the welfare cost of idiosyncratic risk will be overstated if one does not
account for the age proles in the persistence and variance of shocks.
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11 Introduction
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at dierent
ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? Answers to these questions are central
to many economic decisions in the presence of incomplete nancial markets. Uninsured
idiosyncratic risk aects the dynamics of wealth accumulation, consumption inequality, and
the eectiveness of self-insurance through asset accumulation. Thus, income risk is an
important object of study for quantitative macroeconomics. Moreover, the age prole of
persistence can be informative about the economic mechanisms underlying earnings risk.
For these purposes, we propose a novel process for idiosyncratic earnings that allows for a
life-cycle prole in the persistence and variance of earnings shocks.
Two important determinants of labor income risk are the persistence and variance of
shocks. The persistence governs how long the eect of a shock lasts. For example, in
the case of an unexpected health problem, this represents the time to full recovery. The
variance, on the other hand, captures the magnitude by which shocks aect earnings. The
goal of this paper is to estimate the lifetime proles of these two components.
We are motivated by the observation that changes in earnings occur for dierent reasons
over the life span. For young workers, mobility because of a mismatch or demand shocks
to occupations might play an important role (Kambourov and Manovskii (2008)). Midway
through a career, settling down into senior positions as well as bonuses, promotions or
demotions may account for earnings dynamics. Older people are more likely to develop
health problems that reduce their productivity. These changes dier in nature, and more
specically, in persistence and magnitude. Thus, we suspect that variance and persistence
of shocks are constant throughout a lifetime.
In our analysis, we decompose residual earnings into an individual-specic xed eect,
a persistent component and a transitory component. The xed eect captures permanent
dierences among individuals. The persistent component captures lasting changes in earn-
ings and it is modeled as an AR(1) process. The transitory component encompasses both
measurement error and temporary changes in earnings and is i.i.d. The novel feature of our
specication is that both the persistence parameter of the AR(1) process and the variance
of innovations to transitory and persistent components are allowed to vary by age. Besides
allowing for age proles, we also account for changes in variances over time. This paper, to
our best knowledge, is the rst study that estimates a lifetime prole of earnings persistence
2and variance.1
We next turn to identication. Particularly, which features of the data tell us how
changes in earnings vary in persistence and variance over the lifetime? We show that
these proles can be identied using the variance covariance structure of levels of earnings.
Intuitively, we identify the age prole of persistence by tracking the covariance structure
over lags for a given age. The variance of persistent shocks is obtained by exploiting the
variation in the covariance structure over age for a given lag. Finally, the variance of
transitory shocks is recovered from the variance structure. The proof is rigorously discussed
in Appendix A.
Using earnings data from the PSID, we rst estimate a nonparametric specication, i.e.,
without imposing any functional form on the lifetime proles of persistence and variance.
Our results reveal that persistence is increasing at early stages in the working life. Young
agents face only moderately persistent shocks: 70 percent of a shock received during the
early years in the labor market dies out over the next 5 years. Shocks for workers midway
through their careers are more enduring. If the shock was received at age 40, 85 percent
of it would still remain after 5 years. On the other hand, we nd a U-shaped prole for
the variance of persistent shocks: A shock of one standard deviation implies a 26% change
in annual earnings for a 24 year old. The corresponding number for a 40 year old is only
12%. These are sizable dierences. As for the variance of transitory shocks, we nd a slight
increase early on but a at prole for the remaining working life.2
We then ask the question of whether these life-cycle proles are statistically signicant.
To tackle this question, we proceed in two ways. First, we estimate a quadratic function
for the age proles and test whether the coecients on the linear and quadratic terms are
zero. Then, in order to complement this approach, we also estimate life-cycle proles by
partitioning the working life into 3 stages. Here, we assume that persistence and variance
are constant within a stage but might dier from one to the other. Again, we test whether
the prole of persistence and the variance of persistent shocks are at over the lifetime.
Both of these tests strongly reject the hypothesis of a at prole for persistence and the
variance of persistent shocks.
1Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) allow for an age prole in the variance of permanent and transitory shocks.
They don't nd evidence for a nontrivial prole.
2The 95% bootstrap condence intervals point to a at prole. In our specication, transitory shocks
also capture classical measurement error. Therefore, it is not surprising to nd a at prole for transitory
shocks.
3The estimates of persistence in the literature are close to unity.3 Our age-specic es-
timate of persistence lies substantially below 1 for most of the lifetime. We argue that
the high persistence in the literature is driven by targeting the almost linear increase in
lifetime earnings inequality. Namely, estimation avoids lower levels of persistence, which
would imply a concave rise in inequality. The age-dependent income process can capture
the linear shape without high levels of persistence. This is possible because of the inverse
relationship between persistence and the variance of labor income shocks that our estimates
reveal. When persistence goes up with age, the additional increase it induces in inequality
is compensated by a decrease in the variance.
We then investigate the economic implications and economic signicance of the age-
dependent income process. In particular, we ask how much the presence of age proles
matters for the insurability of labor income shocks and the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk.
To address these issues, we study a standard life-cycle model featuring incomplete nancial
markets and a social security system. We compare the consumption-savings implications of
the age-dependent income process with a standard AR(1) process (with constant persistence
and variance).
We start with an economy with natural borrowing constraints (NBC). We nd that
both of the processes imply very similar consumption and asset proles. However, they
dier signicantly in the degree of consumption insurance against persistent shocks. We
measure the level of insurance as the fraction of shocks to earnings that do not lead to
consumption changes (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)). Around 44% of persistent
shocks translate into consumption growth under the age-dependent process compared to
60% under the standard AR(1) specication. Most of this dierence comes from young
workers for whom the degree of insurance is as high as 70% under the age-dependent process
as opposed to 30% under the AR(1) process. This is due to the level of persistence, which is
particularly low for young workers under the age-dependent process. It is well known that
persistence is an important determinant of insurance; transitory shocks are easily insured
by borrowing (e.g., Kaplan and Violante (2008), Gourinchas and Parker (2002)). In the
presence of very persistent shocks, agents refrain from borrowing against the possibility of
a long sequence of low income states. Insurance against such shocks is, therefore, mostly
through assets. This is not possible for young agents, since they don't have enough wealth.
3Estimates of specications that account for the heterogeneity in income growth rates nd lower levels
of persistence. In particular, Guvenen (2009) estimates persistence at around 0:82:
4Persistence is fairly moderate for young workers under the age-dependent income process,
which explains the higher insurance coecients early in careers.
Note that the low levels of persistence under the age-dependent process are compensated
by the larger variances of shocks. On the one hand, lower persistence implies better insur-
ability. On the other hand, larger variance implies more instability. In order to evaluate
this tradeo quantitatively, we compare the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk implied by
the age-dependent process with a standard AR(1) process. We nd sizable dierences: An
agent living in the AR(1) economy is willing to give up around 14:85% of her consumption
permanently in return for perfect insurance as opposed to only 9:97% for an agent under
the age-dependent income process.
As discussed above, the dierences in welfare costs are mostly due to higher insurability.
The fact that the age-dependent income process results in larger insurance coecients relies
crucially on the extent of borrowing limits. In order to quantify the eect of borrowing
limits, we study an economy in which borrowing is ruled out altogether (ZBC economy).
The degree of consumption insurance goes down by a signicant amount under the age-
dependent specication, especially for young workers, for whom insurance falls from around
70% to 26%. This shows the importance of borrowing constraints for young workers.
The decrease in the degree of insurance does have welfare consequences: Welfare costs
increase compared to the NBC economy for both of the specications. The increase is
larger for the age-dependent process, lowering the dierences between the two processes.
However, welfare costs are still signicantly lower under the age-dependent income process
(12:5% and 16:37%, respectively for the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes).
1.1 Related Literature
Our contribution is twofold. First, we contribute to the literature that models idiosyncratic
earnings risk. The estimates of statistical models are used as an input in macroeconomic
models with heterogeneous agents. Dierent specications will induce dierent economic
decisions; therefore, one needs a good measure of labor income risk. A partial list of such
papers includes Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd
and Card (1989) and Baker (1997), although none of the papers above have investigated
the lifetime proles of persistence and variances. Our paper lls that void.
A notable exception is Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), which estimates a process with
a fully permanent component, an MA(q) component where q is estimated, and a fully
5transitory component. Their focus is on conditional heteroskedasticity in permanent and
transitory shocks. Similar to our paper, they also allow for age proles in the variance of
permanent and transitory shocks. However, unlike our paper, they do not allow persistence
to change over the life cycle. They nd no evidence in favor of changing variance over the
lifecycle. In this paper, we argue that it is crucial to allow persistence to change with age.
Another paper related to ours is Hause (1980). Using data on Swedish white collar
workers, he estimates a process that has an AR(1) component with time-specic persistence
and variance of shocks. Since his data set contains only workers born in 1943, it is not clear
whether these proles are age or time-specic. Our paper takes advantage of the rich panel
structure of the PSID and separates changes over time from changes over the life cycle.
Recently, Guvenen (2009) argues for the existence of growth rate heterogeneity and nds
evidence against unit roots. The evidence he brings forward is twofold. First, he points to
the convexity in the variance prole of earnings. Second, he exploits the increase in higher
order covariances. He argues that these can be captured through growth rate heterogeneity
but not by highly persistent shocks. The age-dependent income process can inherently
capture these features of the data without growth rate heterogeneity. Alvarez, Browning,
and Ejrns (2006) investigates the role of heterogeneity in income dynamics of individuals
and nd signicant heterogeneity among seemingly homogeneous individuals. Our paper
can be thought as complementary to theirs in that we focus on observed heterogeneity, that
is, heterogeneity across age.
Another approach to infer the nature of earnings risk is to make use of economic choices.
Guvenen (2007), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and Guvenen and Smith (2009) are
papers that bring consumption data into the picture to make inference about the nature of
income risk. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2004) use schooling decisions and decompose
residual earnings into a component that is foreseen and acted upon (heterogeneity) and
a component that is unanticipated (shocks). Feigenbaum and Li (2008) also make this
distinction and measure income uncertainty as the variance of income forecasting errors at
dierent ages. They nd a U-shaped uncertainty prole over the life cycle. Altonji, Smith,
and Vidangos (2009) consider a structural approach to estimate a joint model of earnings,
employment, job changes, wage rates, and work hours.
We also contribute to the literature on consumption insurance. Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008) develop and apply a methodology to measure the degree of consumption
insurance against permanent and transitory shocks. Kaplan and Violante (2008) argue
6that the lifetime prole of insurance coecients in the data is not consistent with a life-
cycle model that features a standard AR(1) process, since this implies that the insurance
prole follows the prole of assets, which is roughly increasing over the life cycle. However,
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) nd a roughly at insurance prole in the data.
We show that under the age-dependent income process proposed in this paper, the prole
of insurance need not be increasing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the statistical
model that we estimate, discuss its identication and present our results. Section C discusses
the implications of the learning model for residual wages. Section 3 presents the life-cycle
model that is used to study the consumption-savings implications of the age-dependent
process and compares its welfare consequences to a standard AR(1) process. Finally, Section
4 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we describe the statistical model for earnings. We start with a simple age-
dependent income process and discuss its identication. We then introduce the full-blown
model, but the proof of identication is left to the appendix. Empirical results are discussed
at the end of this section.
2.1 An Age-Dependent Income Process
Let ~ yi
h be the residual component of earnings of individual i at age h, which is obtained by
running cross-sectional regressions of earnings on observables.4 The details of this rst-stage
regression are presented later. Residual income is decomposed into a xed eect, an AR(1)
component, and a transitory component. This representation is simple, yet it captures the
salient features of the data well. Therefore, it is widely used in the literature.5 This paper
4Some papers, such as Guvenen (2009), use potential experience as the explanatory variable instead of
age which is dened as age max(schooling;12) 6. This is used as a proxy for actual experience in order
to avoid endogeneity issues. We use age since potential experience is collinear with it. We carried out the
same analysis with potential experience, and the results are similar (see Appendix B.2).
5Some papers, including Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Hryshko (2008), allow for a xed eect, a
permanent component (unit root), a fully transitory component and a persistent component that is modeled
either as an MA(q) or AR(1).
7extends the standard specication to allow for a lifetime prole in the persistence parameter,

























Here, i is an individual-specic xed eect that captures the variation in initial con-
ditions such as innate ability. "i
h is a fully transitory component that encompasses both
measurement error and temporary changes in earnings such as bonuses and overtime pay.6
zi
h is the persistent component of idiosyncratic income at age h that captures lasting changes
in earnings such as promotions and health status. Each period the individual is hit by a
persistent shock of size i
h. The magnitude of this shock is governed by the variance 2
;h
and the extent to which it lasts is determined by the persistence parameter . The key
innovation of our paper is to allow for an age prole in the variance of shocks, 2
;h and 2
";h,
as well as in the durability of the persistent shocks, h.
The age proles capture the idea that changes in earnings occur for dierent reasons
throughout the life span. For example, young households experience high mobility because
of a mismatch or demand shocks to occupations. On the other hand, middle-aged workers
settle down into senior positions and experience promotions or demotions that lead to
changes in earnings. As for older people, the causes of earnings instability are more likely
to be health problems. These sources of earnings dynamics dier in nature, and more
specically, in persistence and magnitude. Thus, we suspect that the variance and the
persistence of shocks are not at throughout the lifetime. Rather than imposing constant
parameters throughout the lifetime, we let the data speak for itself.
Having introduced the age-dependent income process, an immediate concern is identi-
cation. Which features of the data tell us how changes in earnings vary in variance and
persistence over the lifetime? The identication discussion allows us to connect the statis-
tical model to the moments in the data and makes the estimation procedure meaningful.
Intuitively, we identify the prole of persistence by tracking the covariance structure over
6These changes are potentially correlated with future promotions. However, we follow the literature and
assume that these shocks are i.i.d. in nature.
8lags for a given age. The variance of persistent shocks is obtained by exploiting the varia-
tion in the covariance structure over ages for a given lag. Finally, the variance of transitory
shocks is recovered from the variance structure.
The next proposition establishes that the income process (1) is identied and provides
a formal proof:
Proposition 1: Specication (1) is identied in levels up to the normalization that
1 = 2.
Proof: We use the variance-covariance structure in levels that is implied by specication
(1) and outline a strategy to identify the parameters of the statistical model. Below we


























































;h h = 1;:::;H (4)
Let's rst assume that we know the variance of the xed eect, 2
, and show that we
can identify all the remaining parameters. Then we come back to argue that the unused
moment conditions are enough to pin down 2
 uniquely.
Note that since we assume that 2






























= h+1 for h = 1;:::;H   2. This pins
down the whole prole of h for h = 2;3;:::;H   1 except for H.7 Since h is already









h) for 1 < h < H:
Note that it is not possible to identify 1 and var(zi
1) separately. We make the identifying
assumption that 1 = 2. This then pins down var(zi
1). Using the information contained
in (2), we recover 2
;h 8h:
Note that all of the parameters recovered so far depend on 2
. It remains to be shown
that the unused covariances uniquely pin this down. We now show that cov (~ yi
2; ~ yi
5)suces





























































































4) + cov (~ yi
3; ~ yi
5)   cov (~ yi
2; ~ yi
5)   cov (~ yi
3; ~ yi
4)
Finally, we use (4) to identify 2
;h 8h:8 This completes the proof. Notice that there are
still unused moments meaning that the process is overidentied.
2.2 Full Model
In order to better account for earnings dynamics, we extend the basic specication intro-
duced in the previous section by incorporating time eects in variances.
Let yi
h;t denote the log of annual earnings of individual i of age h at time t. To obtain the
residual income ~ yi













The rst component in this specication, f is a function of age and schooling and
captures the life-cycle component of earnings that is common to everyone. Xi
h;t is a vector
of observables that includes a cubic polynomial in age and an education dummy, indicating
whether the individual has a college degree. The parameter  is indexed by t to allow the
coecients on age and schooling to change over time and captures changes in returns to
age and schooling that took place over time.
8The result in proposition 1 tells us that 2
";H and 2
;H are unidentied. This is to be anticipated, since
distinguishing between persistent changes and transitory changes requires us to observe the individual for
several periods (at least one) after the change and see how long the change aects the wage. Obviously, for
the last age this is not possible.
10Figure 1 plots the evolution of residual inequality for the U.S. during our sample period
of 1967-1995. It is obvious that there is a signicant change in residual inequality starting
in the late 1970s. Ignoring the changes that took place over time might bias our estimates of
the age prole of shocks. In particular, changes that occur over time can be misinterpreted
as changes during the life cycle. The rich panel structure of the PSID helps us to distinguish
life-cycle eects from time eects: We observe individuals with a given age at dierent points
in time, and thus at a given year, we observe individuals of dierent ages. This allows us
to separate what is due to calendar time from a life-cycle phenomenon. For this particular
reason, it is important to have a large number of cohorts in order to accurately separate
these eects. This observation will guide our sample selection process, as we will explain in
2.3.
Figure 1: Residual Inequality over Time























Here we follow Gottschalk and Mott (1995), who argue that signicant changes took
place in the variance of transitory shocks as well as persistent shocks and modify (1) as:
11~ y
i





























where t and t represent time loading factors for transitory and permanent shocks, respec-
tively.9
We leave the formal identication proof for the generalized version to Appendix A, since
it doesn't provide any further insight. Here is a heuristic argument. The loading factors on
persistent shocks, t, will be identied through the changes in the covariances over time.
The dierence in the covariances between age 1 and age 2 at dierent points in time must
have come from the change in the respective loading factors. Once we have pinned down
the prole of t's we then look at the variance prole over time for a given age h. Changes
in this variance can be due to a change in the variance of the transitory component or the
persistent component. Since we have already identied the prole of , whatever remains
unexplained will be picked up by , the time prole of transitory shocks. Once we control for
the time eects in the variance and covariance structure, the identication of the parameters
governing the age prole follows from the previous result.
A related approach would be to control for cohort eects. It is reasonable to think
that dierent cohorts face dierent economic environments; thus the changes in the residual
variance structure may be due to the fact that there are dierent cohorts at dierent points
in time. It would be better to allow for cohort eects and time eects in variances at the
same time but this is not possible because age, time and cohort are perfectly collinear.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005) provide some evidence that time eects are
more pronounced than cohort eects.10
9This assumes that changes over time have aected everyone at the same age in the same way.
10Another issue regarding our econometric analysis is measurement error. It has been widely documented
that earnings in the PSID contain substantial measurement error. In this paper, we assume that transitory
changes also capture the measurement error. The true size of transitory shocks is not distinguishable from
the measurement error once we assume fully transitory errors. Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) decompose
residual income into a completely permanent component, a transitory component that is modeled as MA(q)
and an i.i.d. component that they assume to be measurement error. Bound and Krueger (1991) provide
evidence in favor of somewhat persistent measurement errors.
122.3 Data and Sample Selection
This section briey describes the data and the variable denitions used in the empirical
analysis. We use the rst 29 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We
estimate our model using both annual earnings and the average hourly wage of male heads
of households as the measure of labor income. Here, we present the results for earnings data.
Estimation results for wage data are reported in Appendix B.1; the results are qualitatively
the same. We include an individual in our baseline sample if he satises the following
criteria for 3 not necessarily consecutive years: (i) the individual has reported positive
labor earnings and hours, (ii) his age is between 24 and 60, (iii) he worked between 520 and
5110 hours during the calendar year, and (iv) had an average hourly wage between $2 and
$400 in 1993 dollars. We also exclude people from the poverty sub-sample in 1968 (SEO).
These criteria are fairly standard in the literature and leave us with 4380 individuals and
53,864 observations. Sample statistics are reported in Appendix D.
We exclude individuals younger than 24 to abstract from young part-time workers.
Adults older than 60 are also left out to avoid issues related to early retirement. The early
retirement of the elderly increases the variance of residual earnings by a substantial amount,
since some people quit their jobs for low-paying, less intensive jobs. We did our analysis for
a sample between ages 20 and 65; our results are even stronger for this sample. Some of the
changes in persistence and variance that we observe for that sample the phenomenon known
as might be driven by young individuals who move from part-time to full-time employment
or by older individuals who are heterogeneous in retirement age. Therefore, in our baseline
case, we present the conservative results. We report the results for the larger sample in
Appendix B.2.
Another issue with our sample selection criteria is the minimum number of years. Our
choice is guided by the identication argument presented in 2.2. Recall that we need to
observe people of the same age at dierent points in time (and vice versa). Requiring
individuals to stay longer in the sample decreases the number of cohorts that we have in
the data, since it gets rid of the early cohorts.11
11Of course, another source of concern is the sample size; if we were to require individuals to remain in the
sample longer, we would end up with fewer observations. This is important for us, since we are increasing
the number of parameters of the specication along the life-cycle dimension.
132.4 Estimation Results
In this section, we present our estimation results. The emphasis is on the existence of a
nontrivial lifetime prole.
We employ an equally weighted minimum distance estimator. We minimize the distance
between the moments from the theoretical variance-covariance structure and the correspond-













, but we use only those moments to which


























over h. This leaves us with more than 1000
moments. Due to small sample considerations explained in Altonji and Segal (1996), our
minimum distance estimator employs the identity matrix as the weighting matrix.
We start by estimating the lifetime prole of shocks and persistence nonparametrically,
i.e., without imposing any functional form on the lifetime proles. Figure 2 shows the
results for persistence. The point estimates are plotted with dots and the 95% bootstrap
condence interval is shown with dashed lines.
Figure 2 reveals an interesting fact: Early in life, shocks are moderately persistent.
Persistence starts around 0:70 for young individuals and increases with age up to unity by
the age of 45. The dierences also appear to be economically large (although a more precise
evaluation needs to await the consumption model in Section 3). For example, more than
70% of a change in a 24-year-old's earnings dies out in 5 years. This number is only around
15% for a 40-year-old individual.
The variance of persistent shocks (see Figure 3) follows the opposite pattern. Early in
life, shocks are larger compared to in the 40s. The variance starts around 0:05, decreases to
around 0:01 by age 35 and remains roughly at for 10 years. Shocks toward the end of the
life cycle are larger, which manifests itself in a variance of around 0:035. These dierences
again appear to be economically large; a one-standard-deviation persistent shock implies a
26% change in earnings at age 24, whereas a one standard deviation shock implies only a
12% rise for a 40 year old.
14Figure 2: Persistence Prole















Figure 3: Variance Prole of Persistent Shocks






















15Figure 4 plots the variance of transitory shocks. Note that although there is a slight
increase early on, it is not statistically signicant. This is not very surprising, since the
transitory component absorbs the classical measurement error, which we would expect to
be at. In what follows, we take the variance of the transitory component to be constant
over the life cycle.
Figure 4: Variance Prole of Transitory Shocks






















What features of the data give rise to this prole of persistence? In other words, we want
to learn what moments in the data identify the increase in persistence early in the lifecycle.
For this, we refer to the identication argument presented in Section 2.1, where we argued
that the ratio of 2-period ahead covariance to 1-period ahead covariance, corrected for xed
eects, yields a consistent estimate for the persistence parameter.12 The need to correct for
the xed eect arises because both of these covariance terms contain the variance of the
xed eects. We now plot the empirical counterpart of this ratio in Figure 5.
In correcting for xed eects, we use our baseline estimate (2
 = 0:08), which is in
line with the estimates in the literature. The solid line plots the moving average of the






















= h+1 for h = 1;:::;H   2.
16ratio over the lifetime. The shape of the ratio closely resembles our estimate of persistence
prole (shown in dots on the same gure): It increases from 0:78 to 0:94, paralleling our
estimation results in Figure 2. In general, the shape of this ratio depends on the level of
xed eects. To check for the robustness of this, we plot the ratio for the case where there
are no xed eects (2
 = 0), which is shown in dashed lines. We see that the increase in
persistence is robust to the variance of xed eects, though the steepness depends on it.
Note that our estimation of an upward sloping persistence prole is a result of targeting
a fairly complicated variance-covariance structure. The nding in Figure 5 conrms this
increase over the lifetime from a much simpler look at the data.
Figure 5: Identication of Persistence




















2.5 Comparison with the Literature
We now compare the age-dependent process with the benchmark specication, i.e., a speci-
cation consisting of a xed eect, an AR(1) component where the persistence and variance
of shocks are constant throughout life, and an i.i.d. transitory component with constant
variance. In order for these cases to be comparable, we estimate this model using our data.
The dashed lines on Figures 2-4 show the point estimates for persistence, and variance of
persistent and transitory shocks. Our estimate of persistence, 0:978, is in line with the
17estimates in the literature, which range from 0.96-1.0. It is surprising to see that for most
of the life cycle, persistence in the age dependent process is signicantly lower than the
estimate of persistence for the benchmark case. As the examples above have shown, these
dierences can be economically signicant. We will make this point clear in Section 3.
In what follows, we will argue that targeting the lifetime prole of inequality in the data
results in an upward bias in persistence if one does not allow for age-specic persistence
and variance. To do so, we compute the lifetime prole of inequality from the data. To
control for time eects in variances, we compute the variance of residuals for each age-year
bin, d var(~ yh;t). We then regress these on a full set of age and year dummies and report age
dummies.13 The resulting prole is shown in Figure 2.5.14
This gure shows a steady rise in inequality of around 20 log points. The increase is
particularly steep after age 35. For the benchmark process, the corresponding theoretical
moments are given by















z0 represents the initial variance of the persistent component. So long as  < 1,
residual inequality has a well-dened limit, say, var( ~ yh). It can easily be shown that var( ~ yh)
will converge to var( ~ yh) from below in a concave fashion.15 The degree of concavity is more
pronounced the farther away  is from unity. In the case of a unit root, the variance prole
will be linearly increasing, regardless of var( ~ yh). Figure 2.5 obviously implies that the t
would be poor if  is far away from 1. Targeting these moments results in an upward bias
and drives  close to 1 because the statistical model is misspecied.
At this point, it is worth stressing that the age-dependent income process does not need
to contain unit roots or very high levels of persistence to match the inequality prole. Figure
2.5 also plots the smoothed inequality prole implied by our estimates. The model captures
the increase in lifetime inequality even if persistence for young individuals is very low. The
13In order not to have too few individuals contributing to these variances, we include an individual in an
age-year bin if he is within 2 years of that age.
14Some papers choose to control for cohort eects rather than time eects when reporting lifetime prole
of inequality. We have decided to control for time eects for the sake of consistency, since the estimation
controls for time eects.
15Here we implicitly assume that var( ~ y0) < var( ~ yh), which is necessary to have an increasing lifetime
prole.
18mechanism is due to the inverse relationship between persistence and the variance of labor
income shocks. When persistence goes up with age, the additional increase it induces in
inequality is compensated by a decrease in the variance and vice versa. In this manner, the
model is able to replicate the increase in the empirical variance prole with lower levels of
persistence.
Figure 6: Lifetime Prole of Residual Inequality






























Guvenen (2009) estimates a process that allows growth rates of earnings to dier across
individuals. He nds support for signicant heterogeneity in income growth rates and shows
that ignoring this heterogeneity introduces an upward bias for the estimate of persistence.
This paper shows that even if one takes the alternative view that agents are subject to
similar income proles, accounting for age-specic persistence and variances reduces the
estimates of persistence signicantly.
The evidence he brings forward for growth rate heterogeneity is twofold: First, he points
to the convexity in the variance prole of earnings and argues that this feature of the data
indicates the presence of growth rate heterogeneity. Second, he exploits the shape of higher
order covariances, which features an increase in higher lags. This, he argues, can be captured
through growth rate heterogeneity but not by highly persistent shocks. It is worthwhile to
note that the age-dependent income process can naturally capture these features of the data
without growth rate heterogeneity.
As we mentioned in 1.1, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) also allow for age eects while
modeling conditional variances of transitory and persistent shocks, which are found to be
19insignicant. Since their specication assumes fully permanent shocks, i.e., persistence is
constant at unity, it rules out the inverse relationship between variance and persistence that
is crucial in our results. A at prole in persistence suppresses the nontrivial lifetime prole
in the variance of persistent shocks.
2.6 Signicance Tests
We now turn to the question of statistical signicance. Rather than making age-by-age
comparisons using our nonparametric estimates, we want to see whether there is a signicant
pattern that is not at. For this purpose, we proceed in two ways. First, we conjecture a
quadratic function for the age proles of the persistence and variance of persistent shocks
and estimate its parameters from the data. This assumes that life-cycle eects are smooth
in age. Yet, time eects are modeled nonparametrically; i.e., there are separate loading
factors for each year. More specically, we estimate
xh = x;0 + x;1h + x;2h
2 ;
where x is the variable of interest, such as  and 2
. The quadratic polynomial is exible
enough to capture the proles shown in Figures 2 and 3. We then test the hypothesis that
the age pattern is at. For each test, we compute the p-value as the fraction of the bootstrap
runs for which the null hypothesis is violated. The results of the estimation and the test are
presented in Table 1. The implied age proles of the persistence and variance of shocks are
plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Note that these line up well with the nonparametric estimates.16
The rst row of Table 1 shows the results for persistence. The rst three columns
report point estimates along with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. In the last two
columns, we investigate the statistical signicance of these coecients. Column 5 (Column
6) tests if the linear (quadratic) term is signicantly positive (negative). We nd that in
all bootstrap runs the linear (quadratic) term is positive (negative). The same analysis
for the variance of persistent shocks, reported in the second row, shows that the linear
and quadratic terms are signicant at a 99% condence level as well. Thus, based on the
polynomial estimation, we reject that these proles are constant over the lifecycle.
16As explained before, we assume a constant prole of variance for transitory innovations.
20Table 1: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specication
x x;0 x;1 x;2 Test 1 Test 2

0.7638 0.0190 -0.0004 H0 : ;1  0 H0 : ;2  0
(0.0523) (0.0045) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
2

0.0525 -0.0041 0.0001 H0 : 2
;1  0 H0 : 2
;2  0









* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
In order to complete the picture, we choose a specication that is in between the poly-
nomial and the nonparametric specications. We consider a model in which working life
is divided into 3 stages. This model restricts the persistence and variance to be constant
within an age interval but allows them to dier from one to the other. The bins correspond




> > > <
> > > :
x;1 if h 2 [24;33]
x;2 if h 2 [34;52]
x;3 if h 2 [53;60]
These intervals give exibility to the model in capturing arbitrary changes in parameters
over the life cycle without disrupting the parsimonious structure. Furthermore, we do not
want to bias the results by imposing a misspecied functional form. Time eects are still
modeled nonparametrically. Figure 7 provides estimation results for this case along with
95% condence intervals. The results, once again, point to the same prole over the lifecycle.
The variance of persistent shocks follows a U-shape and the persistence is hump shaped.
Condence intervals show that persistence in the second age bin is signicantly larger than
in the rst one. The dierence in persistence between the second and third bins is, however,
not signicant. As for the variance, the second bin has a signicantly lower variance than
the other two bins. To be more formal, we test the hypotheses H0 : 1  2, H0 : 2  3 ,
H0 : 2
;1  2
;2 and H0 : 2
;2  2
;3. The results are summarized in Table 2.
21Table 2: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins
x;1 x;2 x;3 Test 1 Test 2

0.8326 0.9648 0.9458 H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
(0.0266) (0.0170) (0.0265) 0.0000 0.2800
2

0.0295 0.0128 0.0273 H0 : 2
;1  2
;2 H0 : 2
;2  2
;3









* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
Figure 7: Results for Age Bins


























22We nd that the persistence in the rst stage is statistically smaller than the second
stage. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the persistence in the last stage is
dierent than that in the second. For variance, the second bin is signicantly lower than
the rst and third.
Both the analysis of the polynomial and the age-bin specications provides strong evi-
dence that these proles are signicant.
2.7 The Fit for Income Growth Rates
The previous sections have illustrated how the age-dependent process does a better job in
tting the variance-covariance structure using log earnings (levels). This is expected since
the estimation targeted the moments in levels with a larger number of parameters. How
about the t for the variance structure of income growth rates (dierences)? Is the t for
levels better at the expense of a worse t for income growth rates? It is well known in
the literature that the estimates of canonical income processes using levels are strikingly
dierent than the estimates using income growth rates, suggesting misspecication of the
model (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and Violante (2010)). This section investigates this aspect
of the age-dependent process.
The variance structure of growth rates (abstracting from time eects) is as follows:
var(yi;h) = (h 1   1)







The *-marked series in Figure 8 plots the variance prole of income growth rates in the data.
This reveals a U-shaped prole. In order to evaluate the performance of the age-specic
income process, we calculate and plot var(yi;h) using our estimates from the polynomial
specication (dashed line). Similarly, we plot the corresponding series implied by a standard
AR(1) process (solid line). This gure clearly replicates the misspecication we discussed
above: Both the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes are far from matching the level
of variances. However, it is worthwhile to note that the age-dependent process can capture
the U-shaped prole. This is facilitated by the U-shape in the variance prole of persistent
shocks, 2
;h:
The age-dependent income process achieves a better t for the moments in levels without
worsening the t for the moment structure in dierences. Although it cannot match the
magnitude of the variance of income growth rates in the data, it can replicate the age prole.
23Figure 8: Variance Prole of Income Growth Rates
















A natural follow-up question is how to explain these proles economically. Which economic
forces give rise to these? To speculate about one mechanism, these proles could be due
to dierences in insurance opportunities against earnings shocks between young and old
workers. For example, in case of an adverse demand shock to individual's occupation, one
might switch to a dierent one if she is young. For an old worker, though, switching is
costlier (e.g. because of occupation-specic human capital). Therefore, shocks of the same
nature can translate into innovations with dierent persistence over the working life.
Another mechanism, again related to mobility, is learning about the match quality,
rst studied by Jovanovic (1979). In his setup, neither the worker nor the rm know
the productivity of the match before employment. After observing the output, match
productivity is revealed to both parties in a Bayesian fashion. This generates endogenous
movements in wages and job turnover. In Appendix C we show that a very stylized version
of this model implies an increasing persistence prole and a decreasing variance over the
working life. Since this type of models are shown to have empirical support (Flinn (1986)),
we view this as an additional evidence for our ndings.
243 Consumption-Savings Implications
There is a large literature that rejects full insurance for the US economy (Cochrane (1991),
Mace (1991), Attanasio and Davis (1996)) making the nature of labor income risk an im-
portant object to study. This paper so far has established the existence of a nonat lifetime
prole in persistence and variance of shocks. We now investigate its economic implications.
In particular, we are interested in the insurability of labor income shocks and the welfare
costs of idiosyncratic risk under dierent specications for earnings. To address these is-
sues, we consider a standard life-cycle model that features incomplete nancial markets
and a social security system and compare the implications of the age-dependent income
process with a standard AR(1) process. There are several reasons to expect dierent conse-
quences for welfare costs and consumption insurance. First, as we have discussed above, the
age-dependent income process implies lower persistence but larger shocks for young agents.
Kaplan and Violante (2008) show that for reasonably calibrated versions of a Bewley model,
the insurability of shocks is decreasing in persistence. Therefore, one might expect a higher
level of insurance for young agents under the age-dependent income process than under the
standard process. This will imply lower welfare costs of risk compared to the benchmark
case. On the other hand, shocks to earnings are larger for young agents, which in turn re-
sults in larger welfare costs. Ultimately, whether welfare costs are larger or smaller becomes
a quantitative question.
We now describe the model that we use to study the question. The economy is populated














h denotes the consumption of agent i at age h: They engage in labor market activities
for the rst R years of their life and retire afterward. After retirement, they live up to a
maximum age of H:
Financial markets are incomplete in that agents can buy and sell only a risk-free bond.
Letting r denote the risk-free interest rate and ai
h denote the asset level of individual i of













h is the labor earnings at age h: Agents are allowed to borrow up to an age-dependent
level, denoted by  Ah. We assume that everyone of the same age faces the same borrowing
limit and we experiment with two extreme cases: a natural borrowing limit and a zero
borrowing limit.17 It is important to investigate these two cases for the question we have
in mind, because the evaluation of the tradeo between persistence and variance of shocks
depends crucially on the extent of the borrowing limit. Namely, if borrowing limits are loose,
the not-so-persistent but large shocks to young agents can be well insured by borrowing.
On the other hand, in case of tight borrowing limits, the magnitude of shocks matters more.
While in the labor market, agents' earnings have two components. The deterministic
part is common to everyone and follows a quadratic polynomial in age. The idiosyncratic
component captures individual earnings risk and is modeled as discussed in 2.1:
lny
i
h = 0 + 1h + 2h






We consider the implications of two specications for the income process: i) the age-
dependent income process and ii) an AR(1) process with constant persistence and variance
of shocks over the lifetime: h = ; 2
h = 2 8h.
There is a social security system that pays a pension after retirement.18 We model the
retirement salary as a function of the xed eect and the persistent component of income
in the last period, lnyi
h = (i;zi
R). This function is modeled as in Guvenen, Kuruscu,
and Ozkan (2009) and is set to mimic the properties of the US social security system. Its




h) denote the value function of an agent at age h  R, with asset hold-
ings ai
h, xed eect i, persistent component of labor income zi
h and transitory component
of income i
h. The agent's programming problem can be written recursively as
17The natural borrowing limit is the maximum amount that an agent can pay back with future earnings
for sure.




































s:t: (8) and (9)
a
i
h+1     At+1
Upon retirement, the agent has a constant stream of income from social security and








































h+1     Ah+1
3.1 Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to a calendar year. Agents enter the economy at
age 24, retire at 60 and are dead by age 84. We assume CRRA preferences and set the
parameter of relative risk aversion to 2.19 We take the risk-free interest rate to be 3%:
As suggested by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), among others, the crucial part
of our calibration is to pin down the discount factor : We set this parameter to match an
aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. This is important, since the amount of wealth held
by individuals aects the insurability and welfare costs of labor income shocks. We dene
aggregate wealth as the sum of positive asset holdings. Aggregate income is the sum of
labor earnings (excluding retirement pension).
The deterministic component of earnings is estimated using the PSID data. It has
a hump-shaped prole where earnings grow by 60% during the rst 25 years and then
decrease by 18% until the end of the working life. For the residual component of earnings,
we consider two specications: the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes. The rst is
calibrated according to the quadratic specication reported in Table 1. The parameters of
the latter come from our estimates in Figures 2-4.
19This is within the range of estimates in the literature (Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003)).
27In a realistic model of the retirement system, a pension would be a function of lifetime
average earnings, but this would introduce one more continuous state variable to the problem
of the household. We refrain from doing so, since this would complicate the model without
adding any further insight for our purposes. In our model, the retirement pension is a
function of predicted average lifetime earnings. We rst regress average lifetime earnings on
last period's earnings net of the transitory component and use the coecients to predict an
individual's average lifetime earnings, denoted by ^ yLT(i;zi
R). Following Guvenen, Kuruscu,








where AE is the average earnings in the population. The rst term is the same for everyone
and captures the insurance aspect of the system. The second term is proportional to ^ yLT
and governs the private returns to lifetime earnings. We set a = 16:78%; and b = 35:46%:
We discretize all three components of earnings using 61, 11, and 11 grid points for
the persistent component, transitory component, and xed eect, respectively. The value
function and policy rules are solved using standard techniques on an exponentially spaced
grid for assets of size 100. The economy is simulated with 50;000 individuals.20
3.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we report the dierences in consumption behavior induced by the age-
dependent and the AR(1) processes. For every specication, we calibrate the discounting
factor, , to match an aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. We rst start by showing the
results for the economy with natural borrowing constraints (NBC). The resulting discount
factors for the age-dependent and AR(1) processes are 1=(1 + 0:041) and 1=(1 + 0:042),
respectively (see Table 3). Figure 9 shows mean asset and consumption proles. Note that
the asset and consumption proles are very similar for both specications.21 However, even
20The number of grids for the income process is sucient, since simulated earnings are very close to
theoretical earnings. We nd that increasing the grid for assets does not change Euler errors signicantly.
Also, increasing the number of people we simulate does not change the model statistics. We conclude that
the current precision is sucient.
21The model is able to generate a hump-shaped prole for consumption, as reported in Krueger and
Fernandez-Villaverde (2009), but the timing of the hump is later. This t can be improved by adding
mortality risk or health shocks in older ages (Palumbo (1999)).
28though agents are more impatient in the AR(1) economy, consumption growth of young
individuals is steeper. This points to the dierences in precautionary motives (Carroll
(1997)).
Figure 9: Mean Asset and Consumption Proles for NBC













































Figure 10: Consumption Inequality for NBC







































29Figure 10 shows the inequality proles of consumption implied by the two income pro-
cesses. Recall from Figure 2.5 that the initial level of earnings inequality is lower for the
AR(1) process, but that the increases over the lifetime are roughly equal.22 Thus, we focus
on the increase in consumption inequality rather than levels: The increase implied by the
AR(1) process is 21 log points, whereas the age-dependent income process implies a rise of
only 17 log points. This shows that the shocks in the age-dependent process economy are
more insurable.
To make this point clearer, we provide a measure of insurance against persistent shocks
and investigate the dierences between the two processes. Following Kaplan and Violante
(2008) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we compute the degree of consumption
insurance at age h as:








h is the persistent shock faced by worker i at age h. This measures the amount of
change in earnings that does not translate into consumption growth. Figure 11 plots h over
the life cycle for both processes. It is obvious that persistent shocks from the age-dependent
process are better insured throughout the lifetime. On average, 56% of persistent shocks are
insured under the age-dependent process, whereas the corresponding number for the AR(1)
process is only 40%. Strikingly, most of this dierence comes from younger adults. Recall
that for them the level of persistence is particularly low under the age-dependent process.
It is well known in the literature that persistence is an important determinant of insurance.
Transitory shocks are easily self-insured by using the risk-free bond (Kaplan and Violante
(2008)). On the other hand, in the presence of a very persistent component, agents abstain
from borrowing because of the possibility of a long series of bad income states. Insurance
against such shocks is, therefore, mostly through asset accumulation. This is not possible
for young agents since, on average, they are poor. Under the age-dependent income process,
persistence is fairly moderate for young workers, implying insurance coecients as large as
70%.
Another striking dierence between the two processes is the proles of insurance coef-
cients. In the AR(1) process, the prole of insurance tracks the prole of assets. This is
consistent with the previous explanation, since persistence is constant and high throughout
the working life and insurance mainly depends on the amount of assets. Blundell, Pistaferri,
22The increase in the AR(1) process is only 0:01 higher.
30and Preston (2008) approximate insurance coecients against permanent shocks in the data
and nd that this is roughly at over the life cycle.23 Thus, the prole of insurance implied
by an AR(1) process is not consistent with the data (Kaplan and Violante (2008)). The
left panel of Figure 11 shows, however, that the age prole of insurance in a Bewley model
need not track the prole of assets. Note that the prole of assets under the age-dependent
process is very similar to the one under AR(1), but the insurance proles are drastically
dierent. This is solely due to the prole of persistence. Young agents, as explained above,
have access to better insurance since shocks are not very persistent. Insurance decreases
with age in the early part of the working life, since persistence increases. After age 40, on
the other hand, agents have enough assets so that the change in persistence has virtually no
eect on the prole of insurance and thus insurance increases due to the increase in assets.
Figure 11: Insurance against Persistent Shocks
































23They develop an approximation to insurance coecients in a life-cycle model assuming that residual
earnings consist of a completely permanent and a fully transitory component and that there are no borrowing
constraints.
313.3 Welfare Costs of Earnings Risk
We now turn to welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk under the two processes. Recall that
the low levels of persistence under the age-dependent process is compensated by the larger
variance of shocks (Figures 2 and 3). On the one hand, lower persistence implies better
insurability. On the other hand, larger variance implies more instability. In order to eval-
uate this tradeo quantitatively, we compute the fraction of lifetime consumption that an
individual would be willing to give up in order to live in an economy without earnings risk.24
The results are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Welfare Costs under Dierent Income Processes
Natural Borrowing Limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 wealth
income Shocks+Fixed Shocks Insurance
Age-Dependent 1=(1 + 0:0410) 2:9994 15:73% 9:97% 0:56
AR(1) 1=(1 + 0:0420) 3:0001 16:71% 14:85% 0:40
Experiment 1 1=(1 + 0:0414) 2:9995 19:06% 13:51% 0:39
Experiment 2 1=(1 + 0:0418) 2:9994 19:08% 13:55% 0:41
Tight Borrowing Limit
Age-Dependent 1=(1 + 0:0561) 3:0009 18:84% 12:53% 0:39
AR(1) 1=(1 + 0:0562) 3:0008 18:51% 16:37% 0:31
Experiment 1 1=(1 + 0:0549) 3:0013 20:83% 14:72% 0:30
Experiment 2 1=(1 + 0:0558) 3:0009 21:01% 14:90% 0:31
Column 3 shows the welfare costs of not being able to insure against idiosyncratic risk
as well as xed eects. The rst two rows correspond to the age-dependent and AR(1)
24The formula for welfare costs, , is given by






where V is the expected lifetime utility in the economy for which welfare costs are calculated, VComplete
is the expected lifetime utility in the complete markets economy and  is the coecient of relative risk
aversion in the CRRA utility function ( = 2).
32processes, respectively. The age-dependent income process delivers lower welfare costs,
even though the level of inequality at the end of the life cycle is lower for the AR(1) process
(see Figure 2.5). At this point it is not clear how much of these dierences is driven by
shocks and how much is driven by permanent dierences. In order to properly account
for the costs of shocks, we compute the welfare cost of idiosyncratic shocks only.25 These
are reported in Column 4. The dierences between welfare costs are now even larger: An
agent living in the AR(1) world is willing to give up 15% of her consumption every period
in order to have perfect insurance. The same number is only 10% for an agent in the age-
dependent world. We conclude that the eect of lower persistence dominates the eect of
larger instability. These are sizable dierences.
There is a caveat in this analysis: The increase in earnings inequality over the working
life is slightly higher in the AR(1) process (0:1997 vs. 0:1863). Also, the level of inequality
at the beginning of life is lower for the AR(1) process. In order to correct for these, we
modify the parameters of the AR(1) process such that the inequality at the beginning and
the end of the lifetime is the same for both processes. More specically, we adjust the
variance of the xed eect in order to match the inequality at the beginning of the lifecycle.
To match the increase we do the following two experiments: First, we keep the persistence
the same but decrease the variance of persistent shocks from 0:0143 to 0:0129. Second, we
keep the variance the same but decrease persistence from 0:978 to 0:9747. The last two
rows in the top panel report the results for these experiments, respectively.
Note that the results for both experiments are very close. Since we increased the variance
of xed eects, the overall costs of inequality increased compared to the second row (from
16:7% to 19:1%). In addition, since the increase in inequality over the lifetime is now lower,
the welfare costs of shocks are lower, too. However, they are still substantially larger than
the welfare costs under the age-dependent specication. The dierence in welfare costs
almost corresponds to 4% of lifetime consumption.
As explained above, the driving force for welfare dierences is the insurability of earn-
ings shocks. The fact that the age-dependent income process results in larger insurance
coecients relies crucially on the extent of borrowing limits. Young agents would have lit-
tle ability to insure even against moderately persistent shocks if they cannot borrow freely.
25We follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and ask how much an agent with the average xed
eect would be willing to give up in order to live in the economy with complete nancial markets.
33In other words, the evaluation of the tradeo between durability and magnitude might re-
verse. In order to quantify how much it matters, we take it to the extreme and redo the
same analysis for an economy where there is no borrowing at all.26 The bottom panel of
Table 3 presents the results.
The last column reveals that, as expected, insurance goes down by a signicant amount.
The right panel of Figure 11 plots the lifetime prole of insurance coecients for the ZBC
economy. Note that the dierence between the age-dependent and AR(1) processes is
signicantly smaller compared to the NBC economy. The dierence between the NBC and
ZBC economies is substantial for young individuals, for whom insurance falls from around
70% to 26%. The main mechanism of insurance for young agents under the age-dependent
process is borrowing. Since this is not allowed in the ZBC economy, insurance goes down
signicantly.
The decrease in the degree of insurance will have welfare consequences. Column 4 on the
bottom panel of Table 3 shows the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk for the ZBC economy.
As expected, welfare costs have increased compared to the NBC economy for both of the
specications. Note that the increase is larger for the age-dependent process, and thus, the
dierences between the two processes are now lower. However, it is still the case that welfare
costs are lower for the age-dependent process. These results hold also with the experiments
explained above. We conclude that the evaluation of welfare costs is substantially dierent
for the two processes; however, the margin depends on the amount of borrowing allowed.27
4 Conclusion
In the presence of incomplete nancial markets, the nature of labor income risk becomes
an important determinant of individual decision making. In this paper, we have proposed a
novel specication for labor income risk that allows the persistence and variance of shocks
26For the case with tight borrowing constraints, the complete markets economy in the welfare calculations
is the one with full insurance against income risk but with no borrowing.
27Our ndings have implications for the Credit CARD Act of 2009. One of the provisions of this act
restricts individuals under the age of 21 from obtaining credit cards without the consent of their parents. If
shocks were completely permanent, then access to credit would be less crucial since they would not use the
option of borrowing. This paper presented evidence that young agents face very large variances of income
shocks that are moderately persistent. As discussed above, the borrowing limit for young individuals have
signicant welfare consequences under such an income process. Thus using credit lines in this environment
can go a long way as an insurance mechanism making access to credit crucial for young individuals.
34to change over the lifetime and estimated it using data from the PSID. We have found
evidence for a nonat prole in the persistence and variance of persistent shocks, but not
in transitory shocks. Our results reveal that persistence follows a hump shape over the
working life: It starts at 0:75, increases up to unity by age 40 and then slightly decreases
to around 0:95. On the other hand, the variance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-shaped
prole (with a minimum of 0:01 and a maximum of 0:045).
We have investigated the implications of these proles for consumption and savings be-
havior with a life-cycle model. We have found that under natural borrowing constraints,
the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk implied by the age-dependent income process is sig-
nicantly lower compared to a standard AR(1) process. This is mostly due to a higher
degree of consumption insurance for young workers, for whom persistence is low. Namely,
the low level of persistence allows agents to insure themselves against persistent shocks by
borrowing. This mechanism relies crucially on the extent of borrowing limits. In order to
quantify the eect of borrowing limits, we have studied an economy with no borrowing.
The results are qualitatively the same, although the dierence between specications in the
ZBC economy is smaller. We conclude that the welfare cost of idiosyncratic risk will be
overstated if one does not account for the age proles in the persistence and variance of
shocks.
Our ndings have implications for the Credit CARD Act of 2009. One of the provisions
of this act restricts young individuals from obtaining credit cards. According to this paper,
young agents face very large variances of income shocks that are moderately persistent.
This makes access to credit crucial for them.
The benets of public insurance policies are commonly based on the gains from redis-
tribution, which can be proxied by the welfare costs of inequality. This paper presented
evidence that once the researcher accounts for the age-dependent nature of labor income
risk, welfare costs are much smaller.
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38APPENDICES
A Identication
Here, we provide the proof of identication for the full model (6). Again, we will make use




































Proposition: The process in (6) is identied up to the normalizations that 1 = 2, 1 =
1 = H = 1 and 2
;H = 2
;H 1.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one for the simpler specication. We start by
assuming that we know the variance of the xed eect, 2
, and show that we can identify all
the remaining parameters. Then we come back to argue that the unused moment conditions
are enough to pin down 2
.
Note that since we assume that 2






























= h+1 for h = 1;:::;H  
2. This pins down the whole prole of h for h = 2;3;:::;H  1 except for H.28 Note also
that by normalization 1 = 2.





. Once we recover these, we can





























for h = 1;:::;H   1; t =
1;:::;T  1. Please note that var(zi
H;t) for t = 1;::;T and var(zi
h;T) for h = 1;::;H are not
identied yet.
28Note that H does not enter the variance-covariance prole at all, so it is, in fact, not a parameter of
the model.
39Note that all of the parameters recovered so far depend on 2
. It remains to be shown












































































































































































Now, we are ready to identify the loading factors and variances of persistent shocks.
Since var(zi














along t identies t for t = 2;:::;T   1. Consequently, tracing (12)
along the age dimension identies 2
;h for h = 2;:::;H   1. By assumption 2
;H = 2
;H 1
which gives us var(zi
H;1).
Now let's identify 2
;1 using equation 10 for h = 1 and t = 1. Then again using equation
10 for h = 1, t = T we can get var(zi
1;T). Equation 12 for h = 1 and t = T pins down T.
Now we have recovered the entire t prole.
The unidentied parameters so far are the lifetime prole of transitory variances and
their respective loading factors over time. We will show that the information contained in
10 is sucient to identify both of these parameters, thanks to our identifying assumptions









;h for h = 1;:::;H
identifying 2
;h over the life cycle (except for H  1). Fixing h, tracking 10 over t, and using
the fact that we already identied all the parameters except the prole of loading factors
on transitory variances, it is easy to see that t can be recovered for h = 2;:::;H   1.
40B Robustness
B.1 Results with Wage Data
Recall that the paper presented results using earnings data. One concern with earnings is
that dynamics that are in reality due to changes in hours can be interpreted as shocks. This
requires us to check the robustness of our results using data on wages. Wage in our data set
is dened as the ratio of annual earnings to hours worked during that year. Figures 12-15
show the results for wage data.
Figure 12: Persistence Prole














41Figure 13: Variance Prole of Persistent Shocks





















Figure 14: Variance Prole of Transitory Shocks





















42Figure 15: Results for Wages with Age Bins


























The following tables present point estimates as well as the results of signicance tests.
Table 4: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specication (Wage Data)
x x;0 x;1 x;2 Test 1 Test 2

0.7862 0.0163 -0.0003 H0 : ;1  0 H0 : ;2  0
(0.0534) (0.0048) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
2

0.0495 -0.0033 0.0001 H0 : 2
;1  0 H0 : 2
;2  0









* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
43Table 5: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins (Wage Data)
x;1 x;2 x;3 Test 1 Test 2

0.8774 0.9706 0.9558 H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
(0.0266) (0.0170) (0.0265) 0.0040 0.3480
2

0.0280 0.0133 0.0243 H0 : 2
;1  2
;2 H0 : 2
;2  2
;3









* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
B.2 Results with Potential Experience for Ages 20-64
Now, we check the robustness of our ndings with respect to age criteria. Recall that we
required an individual to be between the ages of 24 and 60. In Figures 16-19, we present the
results for the sample with individuals between 20 and 64. Recall, also, that we used age as
the variable that denes the life cycle. Here, we use potential experience as an alternative.29
29This also means that we use potential experience instead of age in our rst-stage regressions.
44Figure 16: Persistence Prole














Figure 17: Variance Prole of Persistent Shocks





















45Figure 18: Variance Prole of Transitory Shocks





















Figure 19: Results for Potential Experience with Age Bins


























46The following tables present point estimates as well as the results of signicance tests.
Table 6: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specication: Potential Experience
x x;0 x;1 x;2 Test 1 Test 2

0.6052 0.0289 -0.0005 H0 : ;1  0 H0 : ;2  0
(0.0505) (0.0030) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
2

0.0943 -0.0071 0.0001 H0 : 2
;1  0 H0 : 2
;2  0









* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
Table 7: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins: Potential Experience
x;1 x;2 x;3 Test 1 Test 2

0.8184 0.9693 0.9218 H0 : 1  2 H0 : 2  3
(0.0359) (0.0170) (0.0278) 0.0000 0.0920
2

0.0351 0.0129 0.0386 H0 : 2
;1  2
;2 H0 : 2
;2  2
;3









* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
47C An Economic Rationale for the Age-Dependent Spec-
ication
Through a series of econometric analyses, we have shown that persistence and variance
of innovations to earnings exhibit non-trivial age proles. A natural follow-up question
would be which economic forces may give rise to these. In this section, we elaborate on the
economic rationale behind having an age-dependent income process.
To speculate about one mechanism, these proles could be due to dierences in insurance
opportunities against earnings shocks between young and old workers. For example, in case
of an adverse demand shock to an individual's occupation, one might switch to a dierent
one if she is young. For an old worker, though, switching is costlier (e.g. because of
occupation-specic human capital). Therefore, shocks of the same nature can translate into
innovations with dierent persistence over the working life.
Another mechanism, again related to mobility, is learning about the match quality,
rst studied by Jovanovic (1979). In his setup, neither the worker nor the rm know
the productivity of the match before employment. After observing the output, match
productivity is revealed to both parties in a Bayesian fashion. This generates endogenous
movements in wages and job turnover. Flinn (1986) presents evidence from NLSY/66 in
favor of this theory. We now study the wage dynamics implied by a simple version of
Jovanovic (1979).
C.1 A Model of Job Mobility
Our economy consists of a continuum of workers endowed with one unit of time per period.
Workers maximize the present value of their lifetime earnings and discount future earnings
at a constant interest rate of r. They are subject to death with constant probability, .
There is measure one of rms that have access to a constant returns to scale production
technology. Labor is the only input to the production.
At the beginning of a period, unemployed workers meet with rms, form a match and
draw a productivity specic to the match, ^ , from a normal distribution with mean  and
variance 2
. The match-specic productivity is not known to the rm and the worker.
Employed workers with tenure t receive their compensation, wt, before production takes
place. Output of the match, yt, is the sum of the match-specic productivity ^ , and an
48i.i.d. shock, t. The latter is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2
. After
observing the output, beliefs are updated in a Bayesian fashion. Because of normality
assumptions, they are characterized by the mean and the precision of the point estimate
about ^ . Let ^ mtjt 1 denote the mean about ^  in period t conditional on all the information
up to period t 1 and let pt denote the precision.30 The law of motion for these are governed
by,






pt = p + (t   1)p (14)
yt = ^ mtjt 1 + !t | {z }
^ 
+t
where !t  N(0;1=pt) represents the deviation of the belief from the true productivity ^ ,
p = 1=2
, and p = 1=2
.
For simplicity, we assume that rms pay workers their expected productivity before
production takes place (i.e. wt = ^ mtjt 1). After updating the beliefs, a worker decides
whether to break the match. If she decides to break the match, she has to pay a xed cost,
C, which represents the direct and foregone earnings costs of changing a job.31


















where ^ m1j0 =  and  = 
1+r.32
C.2 Simulation Results
In order to evaluate this model, we simulate data from the model and estimate the age-
dependent income process. We should note that we do not calibrate the model to match
30Since the information set of the worker and the rm are the same, their beliefs are identical.
31We do not model unemployment in the sense that workers meet new rms and start working immediately
in the next period.
32The initial beliefs are given by the unconditional mean of the distribution for match productivity, thus
they are the same for every quitter.
49any targets in the data. Ours is an exercise of showing that the model has the potential to
generate age proles and replicate our empirical ndings.33 Figure 20 shows the results.
Figure 20: Simulation Results for the Learning Model





























Variance of Persistent Shocks
The top panel shows that persistence prole is increasing with age. The mechanism
behind this increase can be summarized as follows. First, let's consider a worker who stays
in the same job. Her wage can be expressed as the sum of her previous wage and a mean-
zero innovation, implying random walk.34 On the other hand, job switchers always get
33To be more precise, we set  = 2, 2
 = 1, 2
 = 4;  = 1=(1 + r) = 0:95, and C = 0. We simulate
10000 individuals, run the rst stage regressions to obtain the residuals and estimate the nonparametric
specication of the age-dependent process.













pt+p (!t + t) = wt + t; where t  N(0;
p
pt(pt+p)).
50the unconditional mean of the match-specic component , implying 0 covariance between
current and future wages. Therefore, persistence is lower for them. The persistence of
the overall sample is a combination of the persistence of these two subsamples. Over the
lifetime, the fraction of switchers is declining with age due to a selection argument, implying
a rising persistence prole. Furthermore, the bottom panel of Figure 20 shows a decreasing
variance prole for persistent shocks.35 This is because the variance of innovations to wages
declines with tenure for stayers.36
This section presented a theoretical background for our empirical ndings. We have
illustrated that a very stylized model of learning ( a la Jovanovic (1979)) implies an increasing
persistence prole and a decreasing variance over the working life. The mechanism discussed
here is known to have empirical relevance (see Flinn (1986)). Therefore, we also view these
results as complementary to our econometric analysis in Section 2, providing independent
evidence for the age proles.
35Note that the variance of persistent shocks are very low. This is because we did not calibrate the model
to match the data.
36According to the previous footnote, the variance of t is decreasing, since pt is increasing in t.
51D Data
We use the rst 29 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We include an
individual in our baseline sample if he satises the following criteria for 3 not necessarily
consecutive years: (i) the individual has reported positive labor earnings and hours, (ii) his
age is between 24 and 60, (iii) he worked between 520 and 5110 hours during the calendar
year, and (iv) had an average hourly real wage between a minimum of $2 and a maximum
of $400 in 1993. We also exclude people from the poverty sub-sample in 1968 (SEO). These
criteria are fairly standard in the literature and leave us with 4380 individuals and 53,864
observations. Tables 8 and 9 present some summary statistics.
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